--- PDF page 1 --- 1010 SUPREME COURT MINUTES WEDNESDAY, JULY 16, 2025 SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA S173784 PEOPLE v. OYLER (RAYMOND LEE) Rehearing denied; opinion modified ORDER MODIFYING OPINION AND DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING THE COURT: The majority opinion in this matter, filed on May 5, 2025, and appearing at 17 Cal.5th 756, is modified as follows: 1. The third sentence in the second full paragraph on page 771 is modified to read: An arson investigator determined the fire was caused by arson but he was unable to locate an incendiary device. He noted that the origin point of the fire was “buried under & a couple inches of dirt from - the passerby that had stopped to suppress the fire[.]” 2. The third sentence in the first full paragraph on page 772 is modified to read: An arson investigator determined the fire's general point of origin and eliminated all natural and accidental causes for the fire, but was unable to locate any incendiary device. He opined that this may have been due to the disturbed condition of the point of origin. 3. The third full paragraph on page 773 is modified to read: An arson investigator determined the Orchard Fire was caused by arson, but he was unable to locate an incendiary device. He opined that this was due to extensive disturbance of the point of origin by firefighting crews and equipment. 4. The first sentence of the second full paragraph on page 779 is modified to read: In 2000, defendant applied to become a volunteer firefighter. 5. The last full paragraph on page 782 is modified to read: The owner of an auto shop in Banning where defendant worked part-time prior to the June 3 layover device fire-at which investigators found a blue paper towel-testified that his shop used blue paper towels. --- PDF page 2 --- SAN FRANCISCO JULY 16, 2025 1011 6. The first full paragraph on page 851 is modified to read: Defendant contends that the cumulative effect of the guilt and penalty phase errors asserted in his merits briefing requires us to reverse his convictions and death sentence. As to those claims, we have assumed error, but found no prejudice, regarding the trial court’s instruction regarding the arson-murder special circumstance and related challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the finding on that special circumstance, and the admission of evidence in the penalty phase regarding Uncharged Act V. We conclude that the cumulative effect of these assumed errors does not warrant reversal. (See Scully, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 613.) This modification does not affect the judgment. Defendant’s petition for rehearing is denied. S290840 F087487/F087503/F087549/F087558/F087560/F087702 Fifth Appellate District BRING BACK THE KERN v. CITY OF BAKERSFIELD (NORTH KERN WATER STORAGE DISTRICT) Petition for review granted The petition for review is granted. Pending review, the opinion of the Court of Appeal, which is currently published at 110 Cal.App.5th 322, may be cited, not only for its persuasive value, but also for the limited purpose of establishing the existence of a conflict in authority that would in turn allow trial courts to exercise discretion under Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 456, to choose between sides of any such conflict. (See Standing Order Exercising Authority Under California Rules of Court, Rule 8.1115(e)(3), Upon Grant of Review or Transfer of a Matter with an Underlying Published Court of Appeal Opinion, Administrative Order 2021-04-21; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(e)(3) and corresponding Comment, par. 2.) The requests for an order directing depublication of the opinion are denied. Votes: Guerrero, C. J., Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins. and Evans, JJ. S291235 G063066 Fourth Appellate District, Div. 3 PEOPLE v. LUU (PHUOC THIEN) Petition for review granted The petition for review is granted. Pending review, the opinion of the Court of Appeal, which is currently published at 110 Cal.App.5th 1051, may be cited, not only for its persuasive value, but also for the limited purpose of establishing the existence of a conflict in authority that would in turn allow trial courts to exercise discretion under Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 456, to --- PDF page 3 --- SAN FRANCISCO JULY 16, 2025 1012 choose between sides of any such conflict. (See Standing Order Exercising Authority Under California Rules of Court, Rule 8.1115(e)(3), Upon Grant of Review or Transfer of a Matter with an Underlying Published Court of Appeal Opinion, Administrative Order 2021-04-21; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(e)(3) and corresponding Comment, par. 2.) The request for an order directing depublication of the opinion is denied. Votes: Guerrero, C. J., Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and Evans, JJ. S291213 D085451 Fourth Appellate District, Div. 1 PEOPLE v. PIMENTEL (JUAN GABRIEL) Petition for review granted; briefing deferred The petition for review is granted. Further action in this matter is deferred pending consideration and disposition of a related issue in In re Hernandez, S282186 (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.512(d)(2)), or pending further order of the court. Submission of additional briefing, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.520, is deferred pending further order of the court. Votes: Guerrero, C. J., Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and Evans, JJ. S291267 H052768 Sixth Appellate District PEOPLE v. GARCIA (ESEQUIEL PAUL) Petition for review granted; briefing deferred The petition for review is granted. Further action in this matter is deferred pending consideration and disposition of a related issue in In re Montgomery, S287339 (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.512(d)(2)), or pending further order of the court. Submission of additional briefing, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.520, is deferred pending further order of the court. Votes: Guerrero, C. J., Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and Evans, JJ. S291312 E083362 Fourth Appellate District, Div. 2 PEOPLE v. WHIPPLE (LORI ANNE) Petition for review granted; briefing deferred The petition for review is granted. Further action in this matter is deferred pending consideration and disposition of a related issue in People v. Lopez, S287814 (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.512(d)(2)), or pending further order of the court. Submission of additional briefing, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.520, is deferred pending further order of the court. Votes: Guerrero, C. J., Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and Evans, JJ. --- PDF page 4 --- SAN FRANCISCO JULY 16, 2025 1013 S291321 G063744 Fourth Appellate District, Div. 3 PEOPLE v. VEGA (MOISES NAPOLEON) Petition for review granted; briefing deferred The petition for review is granted. Further action in this matter is deferred pending finality of People v. Rhodius (June 26, 2025, S283169) __ Cal.5th __ (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.512(d)(2)), or pending further order of the court. Submission of additional briefing, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.520, is deferred pending further order of the court. Votes: Guerrero, C. J., Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and Evans, JJ. S291360 H051547 Sixth Appellate District PEOPLE v. ORR (TAYLON JEROME) Petition for review granted; briefing deferred The petition for review is granted. Further action in this matter is deferred pending finality of People v. Rhodius (June 26, 2025, S283169) __ Cal.5th __ (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.512(d)(2)), or pending further order of the court. Submission of additional briefing, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.520, is deferred pending further order of the court. Votes: Guerrero, C. J., Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and Evans, JJ. S291366 G063809 Fourth Appellate District, Div. 3 PEOPLE v. WHITLEY (JAQUAN DONTA) Petition for review granted; briefing deferred The petition for review is granted. Further action in this matter is deferred pending finality of People v. Rhodius (June 26, 2025, S283169) __ Cal.5th __ (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.512(d)(2)), or pending further order of the court. Submission of additional briefing, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.520, is deferred pending further order of the court. Votes: Guerrero, C. J., Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and Evans, JJ. S291374 H051852 Sixth Appellate District PEOPLE v. SALCIDO (PAUL JIMMY) Petition for review granted; briefing deferred The petition for review is granted. Further action in this matter is deferred pending consideration and disposition of a related issue in In re Montgomery, S287339 (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.512(d)(2)), or pending further order of the court. Submission of additional briefing, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.520, is deferred pending further order of the court. Votes: Guerrero, C. J., Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and Evans, JJ. --- PDF page 5 --- SAN FRANCISCO JULY 16, 2025 1014 S291376 G063772 Fourth Appellate District, Div. 3 PEOPLE v. SMITH (THADDEUS EUGENE) Petition for review granted; briefing deferred The petition for review is granted. Further action in this matter is deferred pending finality of People v. Rhodius (June 26, 2025, S283169) __ Cal.5th __ (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.512(d)(2)), or pending further order of the court. Submission of additional briefing, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.520, is deferred pending further order of the court. Votes: Guerrero, C. J., Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and Evans, JJ. S291388 G063755 Fourth Appellate District, Div. 3 PEOPLE v. SHAW (ANTHONY GERAN) Petition for review granted; briefing deferred The petition for review is granted. Further action in this matter is deferred pending finality of People v. Rhodius (June 26, 2025, S283169) __ Cal.5th __ (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.512(d)(2)), or pending further order of the court. Submission of additional briefing, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.520, is deferred pending further order of the court. Votes: Guerrero, C. J., Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and Evans, JJ. S291425 E083225 Fourth Appellate District, Div. 2 PEOPLE v. QUINTANA (ROBERT EARL) Petition for review granted; briefing deferred The petition for review is granted. Further action in this matter is deferred pending finality of People v. Rhodius (June 26, 2025, S283169) __ Cal.5th __ (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.512(d)(2)), or pending further order of the court. Submission of additional briefing, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.520, is deferred pending further order of the court. Votes: Guerrero, C. J., Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and Evans, JJ. S291434 G063780 Fourth Appellate District, Div. 3 PEOPLE v. MORENO (FERNANDO) Petition for review granted; briefing deferred The petition for review is granted. Further action in this matter is deferred pending finality of People v. Rhodius (June 26, 2025, S283169) __ Cal.5th __ (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.512(d)(2)), or pending further order of the court. Submission of additional briefing, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.520, is deferred pending further order of the court. Votes: Guerrero, C. J., Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and Evans, JJ. --- PDF page 6 --- SAN FRANCISCO JULY 16, 2025 1015 S291437 B340707 Second Appellate District, Div. 7 SANDERS (MONE YVETTE) v. S.C. (EDWARD D. JONES & CO., L.P.) Petition for review granted; briefing deferred The petition for review is granted. Further action in this matter is deferred pending consideration and disposition of a related issue in Hohenshelt v. Superior Court (Golden State Foods Corporation), S284498 (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.512(d)(2)), or pending further order of the court. Submission of additional briefing, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.520, is deferred pending further order of the court. Votes: Guerrero, C. J., Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and Evans, JJ. S283708 C097977 Third Appellate District PEOPLE v. JACKSON (TAVARES DESHAWN) Transferred to Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, after hold The above-captioned matter is transferred to the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, with directions to vacate its decision and reconsider the cause in light of People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.528(d).) Votes: Guerrero, C. J., Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and Evans, JJ. S284049 B328585 Second Appellate District, Div. 5 PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ (ANGELA) Transferred to Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, after hold The above-captioned matter is transferred to the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, with directions to vacate its decision and reconsider the cause in light of People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.528(d).) Votes: Guerrero, C. J., Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and Evans, JJ. S285472 B328773 Second Appellate District, Div. 7 PEOPLE v. WORTHEN (MATTHEW ALBERT) Transferred to Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, after hold The above-captioned matter is transferred to the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, with directions to vacate its decision and reconsider the cause in light of People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.528(d).) Votes: Guerrero, C. J., Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and Evans, JJ. --- PDF page 7 --- SAN FRANCISCO JULY 16, 2025 1016 S285777 C098698 Third Appellate District PEOPLE v. VERRETT (DAMIEN) Transferred to Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, after hold The above-captioned matter is transferred to the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, with directions to vacate its decision and reconsider the cause in light of People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.528(d).) Votes: Guerrero, C. J., Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and Evans, JJ. S286314 F085868 Fifth Appellate District PEOPLE v. WILLIAMS (KYLE ANDREW) Transferred to Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, after hold The above-captioned matter is transferred to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, with directions to vacate its decision and reconsider the cause in light of People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.528(d).) As explained in Standing Order Exercising Authority Under California Rules of Court, Rule 8.1115(e)(3), Upon Grant of Review or Transfer of a Matter with an Underlying Published Court of Appeal Opinion, Administrative Order 2021- 04-21, and California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(e)(3), corresponding comment, paragraph 3, the opinion is hereby rendered either “depublished” or “not citable.” Votes: Guerrero, C. J., Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and Evans, JJ. S286469 B329064 Second Appellate District, Div. 5 PEOPLE v. SCARANO (CHRISTOPHER FRANCIS) Transferred to Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, after hold The above-captioned matter is transferred to the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, with directions to vacate its decision and reconsider the cause in light of People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.528(d).) Votes: Guerrero, C. J., Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and Evans, JJ. S286724 E081229/E082184 Fourth Appellate District, Div. 2 PEOPLE v. SMITH III (WILLIE ROY) Transferred to Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, after hold The above-captioned matters are transferred to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, with directions to vacate its decisions and reconsider the causes in light of People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.528(d).) Votes: Guerrero, C. J., Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and Evans, JJ. --- PDF page 8 --- SAN FRANCISCO JULY 16, 2025 1017 S286990 B329953 Second Appellate District, Div. 5 PEOPLE v. CARBAJAL (ALBERTO HERNANDEZ) Transferred to Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, after hold The above-captioned matter is transferred to the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, with directions to vacate its decision and reconsider the cause in light of People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.528(d).) Votes: Guerrero, C. J., Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and Evans, JJ. S287626 B330399 Second Appellate District, Div. 8 PEOPLE v. LOQUELLANO (ANTHONY SALVADOR) Transferred to Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, after hold The above-captioned matter is transferred to the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, with directions to vacate its decision and reconsider the cause in light of People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.528(d).) Votes: Guerrero, C. J., Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and Evans, JJ. S287780 A167782 First Appellate District, Div. 4 PEOPLE v. CURRY (RENARD RICKY) Transferred to Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, after hold The above-captioned matter is transferred to the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, with directions to vacate its decision and reconsider the cause in light of People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.528(d).) Votes: Guerrero, C. J., Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and Evans, JJ. S287917 B331710 Second Appellate District, Div. 6 PEOPLE v. ALAZAR (JUAN) Transferred to Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, after hold The above-captioned matter is transferred to the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, with directions to vacate its decision and reconsider the cause in light of People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.528(d).) As explained in Standing Order Exercising Authority Under California Rules of Court, Rule 8.1115(e)(3), Upon Grant of Review or Transfer of a Matter with an Underlying Published Court of Appeal Opinion, Administrative Order 2021-04-21, and California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(e)(3), corresponding comment, paragraph 3, the opinion is hereby rendered either “depublished” or “not citable.” Votes: Guerrero, C. J., Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and Evans, JJ. --- PDF page 9 --- SAN FRANCISCO JULY 16, 2025 1018 S288431 B331802 Second Appellate District, Div. 8 PEOPLE v. SMITH (KENNETH EDWARD) Transferred to Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, after hold The above-captioned matter is transferred to the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, with directions to vacate its decision and reconsider the cause in light of People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.528(d).) Votes: Guerrero, C. J., Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and Evans, JJ. S290685 BRUNO-MARTINEZ (JOSEPH) ON CLEMENCY Letter sent to Governor with the recommendation required by article V, section 8 of the California Constitution for the Governor to grant clemency The Honorable Gavin Newsom Governor, State of California State Capitol Building Sacramento, CA 95814 Re: Joseph Bruno-Martinez Legal Affairs File No.: GO No. 10432-18 Case Number: S290685 Executive Clemency Number: 1261 Dear Governor Newsom: On the application of Joseph Bruno-Martinez for commutation of sentence, your office requested a recommendation under article V, section 8 of the California Constitution in order to grant a commutation of sentence to the applicant. The request stated: “The Governor is contemplating a commutation of sentence that would make Mr. Bruno-Martinez eligible for an earlier parole suitability hearing.” The court, with at least four judges concurring, hereby grants the request and issues the recommendation required by article V, section 8 of the California Constitution. Sincerely, PATRICIA GUERRERO Chief Justice of California --- PDF page 10 --- SAN FRANCISCO JULY 16, 2025 1019 S290506 B318925/B321227 Second Appellate District, Div. 5 CAMP (JASON) v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT Petition for review & publication request(s) denied S290568 B322728 Second Appellate District, Div. 5 MELGOZA (MARIA) v. SALAZAR (RAMON) Petition for review & publication request(s) denied S290590 B334021 Second Appellate District, Div. 6 LITTLE (MICHAEL) v. THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Petition for review & publication request(s) denied S290629 C099783 Third Appellate District IN RE S.F. Petition for review denied Liu and Evans, JJ., are of the opinion the petition should be granted. S290666 B336905 Second Appellate District, Div. 1 CINAMOM’S GOODIES, INC. v. E & Z FOOD SERVICES, INC. Petition for review denied S290693 G065400 Fourth Appellate District, Div. 3 GEKKO (RACHAEL) v. S.C. (BATAVIA BUSINESS CENTER, LLC) Petition for review denied S290716 B330525 Second Appellate District, Div. 1 PEOPLE v. GRAY (DERRICK ELLIOT) Petition for review denied The petition for review is denied. Liu and Evans, JJ., are of the opinion the petition should be granted. (See Dissenting Statement by Justice Evans.) --- PDF page 11 --- SAN FRANCISCO JULY 16, 2025 1020 In 1982, Defendant Derrick Elliott Gray was convicted of felony murder with a special circumstance finding that the murder was committed during a felony, in this case, a robbery or burglary. (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(17); subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code.) According to the factual recitation set forth in the decision on direct appeal, Gray (who was 18 years old at the time of offense) and a codefendant committed a robbery and burglary, during which they bound and gagged the 77-year-old victim, who died from strangulation or suffocation. (People v. Gray (Oct. 4, 1983, 2 Crim. No. 42179) [nonpub. opn.] (Gray I).) Gray was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for the murder. At the time of Gray’s trial and conviction, “[f]elony-murder liability [did] not require an intent to kill, or even implied malice, but merely an intent to commit the underlying felony.” (People v. Gonzalez (2012) 54 Cal.4th 643, 654.) With the enactment of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 1437) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 3), however, the Legislature overhauled the state's murder statutes. (People v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867.) “Pertinent here, Senate Bill No. 1437 significantly narrowed the scope of the felony-murder rule by adding subdivision (e) to Penal Code section 189.” (Id. at p. 880.) Pursuant to that provision, “[a] participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a [specified felony] in which a death occurs is liable for murder only if one of the following is proven: [¶] (1) The person was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was not the actual killer, but with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree. [¶] (3) The person was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.” (§ 189, subd. (e).) Senate Bill No. 1437 also created a procedural mechanism for those previously convicted of murder under a theory amended in the bill to petition for resentencing. (See § 1172.6; People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 449 (Curiel).) A trial court acting on such a petition first must evaluate whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) “ ‘If the petition and record in the case establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial court may dismiss the petition.’ ” (Curiel, at p. 450, citing § 1172.6, subd. (c).) “ ‘If, instead, the defendant has made a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, “the court shall issue an order to show cause.” ’ ” (Curiel, at p. 450, quoting § 1172.6, subd. (c).) At an evidentiary hearing, “the burden of proof shall be on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder” under state law as amended by Senate Bill No. 1437. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) If the prosecution fails to sustain its burden of proof, the murder conviction “shall be vacated and the petitioner shall be resentenced on the remaining charges.” (Ibid.) Some 40 years after his conviction, Gray petitioned for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6. After the trial court determined that Gray stated a prima facie case for relief and issued an order to show cause why the petition should not be granted, the People conceded that Gray was entitled to relief. At the evidentiary hearing, the trial court summarily rejected the People’s concession and, without prior notice to the parties, sua sponte reconsidered its prima facie finding. Although much of the original trial record had been lost, the court took the view that jury instructions --- PDF page 12 --- SAN FRANCISCO JULY 16, 2025 1021 purportedly given at Gray’s trial established conclusively that he was ineligible for relief. 1 ———————————— 1 Aside from a handful of pages not relevant here, the original trial records have been lost. Attached as exhibit 2 to the “People’s Response to Petition for Resentencing Pursuant to Penal Code Section 1172.6” is a set of jury instructions purportedly given in the case. The filing is not accompanied by a declaration, and thus, the provenance of the instructions - which are not separately available as part of either the clerk’s or reporter's transcripts - is unknown. The document is file stamped May 17, 1982. The People describe it as “Jury Instructions - Given,” although the exhibit itself includes the markings “Given” and “Refused.” Those jury instructions provide that murder “is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought.” The instruction on express malice is struck through. The implied malice instruction states: “Malice is implied when the killing is a direct causal result of the perpetration or the attempt to perpetrate a burglary or robbery.” The only theory of murder presented in the instructions is first degree felony murder. Consistent with the law in effect at that time, the instruction imposes liability for a killing, “whether intentional, unintentional or accidental, which occurs as a result of the commission of or attempt to commit the crime of burglary or robbery, and where there was in the mind of the perpetrator the specific intent to commit such crime.” Lastly, the felony-murder special-circumstance instruction states that the jury may return a true finding thereon only if it is proved that Gray “intentionally aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested or assisted the actual killer in the commission of the murder in the first degree.” The trial court found Gray ineligible for relief based solely on the special circumstance instruction, from which the court concluded that the jury necessarily found “intent to kill.” The trial court gave preclusive effect to this purported finding without conducting any issue preclusion analysis. (Cf. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th 433.) The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order denying Gray’s resentencing petition, also without conducting such an analysis. (People v. Gray (Sept. 20, 2024, B330525) [nonpub. opn.] (Gray II).) The Court of Appeal relied instead on People v. Warren (1988) 45 Cal.3d 471, 487 (Warren) for the proposition that this version of the special circumstance instruction is not erroneous for failure to require intent to kill. (Gray II, B330525.) We granted Gray’s petition for review and transferred the case to the Court of Appeal to reconsider in light of Curiel. Upon reconsideration, the Court of Appeal concluded that Curiel does not compel a different result. (People v. Gray (Mar. 25, 2025, B330525) [nonpub. opn.] (Gray III).) The Court of Appeal again bypassed an analysis of the state of the law at the time of Gray's trial and conviction, instead invoking Warren to conclude that the special circumstance instruction “could only be interpreted to require the jury to find intent to kill.” (Gray III, B330525.) As explained below, this approach is subject to question. In Curiel, we explained that issue preclusion bars relitigation of issues earlier decided only if several threshold requirements are fulfilled. (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 451.) As pertinent here, the issue sought to be precluded from relitigation must be identical to that decided in a --- PDF page 13 --- SAN FRANCISCO JULY 16, 2025 1022 former proceeding; it must have been actually litigated in the former proceeding; and it must have been necessarily decided in the former proceeding. (Ibid.) “ ‘An issue is actually litigated “[w]hen [it] is properly raised, by the pleadings or otherwise, and is submitted for determination, and is determined . . . .” ’ ” (Id. at p. 452.) “An issue is necessarily decided so long as it was not ‘ “entirely unnecessary” to the judgment in the initial proceeding.’ ” (Ibid.) The party asserting collateral estoppel bears the burden of establishing these requirements. (Ibid.) 2 “ ‘In considering whether these criteria have been met, courts look carefully at the entire record from the prior proceeding, including the pleadings, the evidence, the jury instructions, and any special jury findings or verdicts.’ ” (Curiel, at p. 451.) ———————————— 2 Although, in this case, that burden seemingly would have fallen to the trial court after it rejected the People's concession. Here, setting aside any threshold concern that the lower courts did not look carefully at the entire record from Gray’s trial - because it no longer exists - the special circumstance instruction given at Gray’s trial did not expressly require “intent to kill.” This is not surprising, given that, at the time of Gray’s trial and conviction, the special circumstance statute was not thought to require intent to kill. (See Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131, 139-143, overruled by People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104 (Anderson) [see fn. 1, post].) The statute, as rewritten by voters in 1978, specifically eliminated an earlier requirement that a defendant “ ‘with intent to cause death physically aided or committed such act or acts causing death.’ ” (Carlos, at p. 139, quoting former § 190.2, subd. (c); see Carlos, at pp. 140, 143.) Instead, the voters chose to impose liability where “[t]he murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in, or was an accomplice in, the commission of” an enumerated felony, including robbery and burglary. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17), added by initiative, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1978), eff. Nov. 8, 1978 [commonly known as Prop. 7].) “The absence of any express requirement of intentionality” in this section suggested that the special circumstance applied to a defendant “whether or not he intended to kill.” (Carlos, at p. 140; see also People v. Silbertson (1985) 41 Cal.3d 296, 304 [noting, in a “pre-Carlos case, intent to kill seemed irrelevant to both the felony-murder charge and the robbery special circumstance”].) On December 12, 1983, after Gray’s trial and conviction - and, indeed, after his direct appeal was decided - this court interpreted subdivision (a)(17) of section 190.2, together with former subdivision (b) of the same section, to conclude that the felony-murder special circumstance requires intent to kill. (Carlos, at pp. 142-143, 153-154.) That decision was based, in part, on the (partially erroneous) conclusion that the statute had to be so construed to avoid serious constitutional questions. (Id. at pp. 136, 147-153; see Anderson, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1141 [explaining “one of the bases on which we rested our decision in Carlos” proved to be unsound].) 3 ———————————— 3 In Anderson, this court overruled “the broad holding of Carlos that intent to kill is an element of the felony-murder special circumstance” and replaced it with a narrower holding: “when the --- PDF page 14 --- SAN FRANCISCO JULY 16, 2025 1023 defendant is an aider and abetter rather than the actual killer, intent must be proved before the trier of fact can find the special circumstance to be true.” (Anderson, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 1138- 1139.) Former subdivision (b) of section 190.2, since redesignated as subdivision (c), now imposes liability for “[e]very person, not the actual killer, who, with the intent to kill, aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, solicits, requests, or assists any actor in the commission of murder in the first degree.” (§ 190.2, subd. (c), italics added.) The standard jury instructions have been modified accordingly, expressly requiring “intent to kill.” (CALJIC No. 8.80; CALCRIM No. 701.) Given the state of the law at the time of Gray’s trial and conviction, I question whether the threshold requirements of issue preclusion are met. The issue of whether Gray acted with intent to kill was not properly raised, by the pleadings or otherwise, because none of the charged crimes or special circumstance required such a finding. If there is any doubt that the felony-murder special circumstance was not thought to require intent to kill when the jury in this case rendered its verdict, such doubt is resolved by the fact that no express malice instruction was given. The jury was never instructed on “intent to kill,” and those words appear nowhere in the charge. 4 ———————————— 4 Gray noted below that the trial court did not instruct his jury on express malice. (See Gray III, supra, B330525.) The Court of Appeal observed that this does not assist in answering the “key question,” i.e., whether the special circumstance instruction required a finding of intent to kill, a matter on which it found Warren, supra, 45 Cal.3d at page 488 conclusive. (Gray III, supra, B330525.) The Court of Appeal observed that, “[h]ad the jury in Warren found express malice, i.e., specific intent to kill, then it would not have been necessary to decide whether the special circumstance instruction required a finding of intent to kill.” (Ibid.) This confuses two distinct questions: (1) whether the jury's verdict in Warren necessarily reflected a finding of express malice, as opposed to reliance on some alternative theory of guilt; and (2) whether the jury in Warren was instructed on express malice at all. I agree with Gray that the complete absence of an express malice instruction in this case is informative. However a reasonable jury might understand the special circumstance instruction under different circumstances (see post, discussing Warren, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 488), it is difficult to conclude that the jury in this case would have thought a finding of intent to kill was required or that it necessarily made such a finding. It is indeed difficult to reach such a conclusion, given that nobody else in the room - not the presiding judge, the prosecutor, or the defense attorney - likely would have shared the view that a finding of intent to kill was required under the law in effect at that time. Accordingly, the issue of intent to kill was not “ ‘ “actually litigated” ’ ” or “ ‘ “necessarily decided.” ’ ” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 451, 452.) Rather, it was “entirely unnecessary” to the judgment. (Ibid.) Even where the threshold requirements of issue preclusion are satisfied, “ ‘ “the doctrine will not be applied if such application would not serve its underlying fundamental principles” of promoting efficiency while ensuring fairness to the parties.’ ” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. --- PDF page 15 --- SAN FRANCISCO JULY 16, 2025 1024 454.) We recognized one well-settled exception to the general rule of issue preclusion in People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 716, that is, “when there has been a significant change in the law since the factual findings were rendered that warrants reexamination of the issue.” (Cf. Curiel, at p. 455 [noting the “intent to kill finding that was required at the time of Curiel’s trial was governed by the same standards that exist today”].) Although the concept of express malice has not undergone a significant reformation, intent to kill simply was not required for a true finding on the felony-murder special circumstance at the time of Gray’s trial and conviction. It is therefore doubtful that Gray had either the opportunity or incentive to litigate the issue of intent to kill, which was likewise not required for his underlying felony-murder conviction. (Cf. Id. at p. 459 [noting that Curiel “had more than adequate incentive to litigate his intent to kill” because, even setting aside the consequences of the special circumstance, “it was an element of the crime of murder” under one of the theories pursued by the prosecution].) However a reasonable jury might understand the special circumstance instruction under different circumstances (see post, discussing Warren, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 488), it is difficult to conclude that the jury in this case would have thought a finding of intent to kill was required or that it necessarily made such a finding. It is indeed difficult to reach such a conclusion, given that nobody else in the room - not the presiding judge, the prosecutor, or the defense attorney - likely would have shared the view that a finding of intent to kill was required under the law in effect at that time. Accordingly, the issue of intent to kill was not “ ‘ “actually litigated” ’ ” or “ ‘ “necessarily decided.” ’ ” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 451, 452.) Rather, it was “entirely unnecessary” to the judgment. (Ibid.) Even where the threshold requirements of issue preclusion are satisfied, “ ‘ “the doctrine will not be applied if such application would not serve its underlying fundamental principles” of promoting efficiency while ensuring fairness to the parties.’ ” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 454.) We recognized one well-settled exception to the general rule of issue preclusion in People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 716, that is, “when there has been a significant change in the law since the factual findings were rendered that warrants reexamination of the issue.” (Cf. Curiel, at p. 455 [noting the “intent to kill finding that was required at the time of Curiel’s trial was governed by the same standards that exist today”].) Although the concept of express malice has not undergone a significant reformation, intent to kill simply was not required for a true finding on the felony-murder special circumstance at the time of Gray’s trial and conviction. It is therefore doubtful that Gray had either the opportunity or incentive to litigate the issue of intent to kill, which was likewise not required for his underlying felony-murder conviction. (Cf. Id. at p. 459 [noting that Curiel “had more than adequate incentive to litigate his intent to kill” because, even setting aside the consequences of the special circumstance, “it was an element of the crime of murder” under one of the theories pursued by the prosecution].) As stated above, the Court of Appeal did not conduct a comprehensive issue preclusion analysis, relying instead on Warren, another case decided years after Gray’s trial and conviction. Our task in Warren was to consider how a reasonable juror would understand the special circumstance instruction given in that case and, “if necessary, the charge in its entirety.” (Warren, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 487.) The Warren majority recognized that the language of the special circumstance --- PDF page 16 --- SAN FRANCISCO JULY 16, 2025 1025 instruction, considered together with the felony-murder instruction, “might conceivably be understood to mean that a special-circumstance finding could be made as to an aider and abetter if he acted merely with the intent to commit robbery and not with the intent to kill.” (Id. at pp. 487- 488.) The majority nonetheless held that a reasonable juror would construe the instruction to require intent to kill. (Ibid.) A three-justice concurrence noted that there was a “serious question whether the instructions satisfactorily informed the jury” that it had to find an aider and abettor intended to kill before sustaining the special circumstance allegation. (Id. at p. 490 (conc. opn. of Arguelles, J.).) The concurrence found it unnecessary to resolve that question, however, because even assuming the instructions were inadequate, the error was not prejudicial. (Ibid. [noting that the defendant answered in the affirmative when his coparticipant asked, “ ‘Can I shoot?’ ”].) As noted by Gray, Warren raised a claim of instructional error, asking whether a reasonable jury would have understood the instructions given in that case to require intent to kill. Contrary to the Court of Appeal’s assertion (Gray III, supra, B330525 [“the issue in Warren is identical to the issue before us”]), Warren did not decide the issue relevant here - whether Gray’s jury necessarily found that he acted with intent to kill. (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 467 [in order to find an element satisfied at the prima facie stage of §1172.6 proceedings, “we must be confident the jury necessarily found” that element].) Bare reliance on Warren is therefore misguided, as it overlooks whether intent to kill was required by law at the time of Gray’s trial and conviction. (See People v. Antonelli (2025) 17 Cal.5th 719, 730-731 [the defendant was not categorically ineligible for relief under § 1172.6 because the law in effect at the time of his trial and conviction did not require proof that he personally harbor malice].) Eligibility for relief under section 1172.6 generally “will turn on an examination of both the governing law at the time of trial and the record of conviction, including the jury instructions.” (Antonelli, at p. 731.) The Court of Appeal dismissed Gray’s reliance on Carlos, suggesting it was “misplaced” because Carlos “does not cast doubt on Warren, a subsequent case.” (Gray III, B330525.) But Carlos imposed the requirement of intent to kill only after Gray’s trial and conviction. Thus, it should be central to the issue preclusion analysis. (See Antonelli, at pp. 727-731; id. at p. 729 [identifying People v. Concha (2009) 47 Cal.4th 653, which first held that provocative act murder requires a finding that the defendant personally harbored malice, as “the relevant turning point” in the law].) Because the law frequently undergoes revision, I urge lower courts to conduct a considered issue preclusion analysis before concluding that a defendant is ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 based on jury findings rendered decades ago. In my view, the failure to do so in this case constitutes a miscarriage of justice. Gray was 18 years old at the time of the offense and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for a murder that, according to the facts laid out in the decision on direct appeal, could have been unintentional. (Gray I, supra, 2 Crim. No. 42179.) In view of the foregoing, I would grant review of this matter, notwithstanding that there is no published conflict on the issue. I note that our denial of review does not necessarily preclude other forms of relief, including recall and resentencing upon the recommendation of the district attorney (§ 1172.1), or pursuant to a commutation recommendation (§ 4801, subd. (a) [“The Board of Parole Hearings may report to the Governor, from time to time, the names of any and all persons imprisoned in any state prison who, in its judgment, ought to have a commutation of sentence or be pardoned and set at liberty on account of good conduct, or unusual term of --- PDF page 17 --- SAN FRANCISCO JULY 16, 2025 1026 sentence, or any other cause”]). EVANS, J. I Concur: LIU, J. S290741 G065005 Fourth Appellate District, Div. 3 KRAUS (SUSAN) v. GRAHAM (BRETT) Petition for review denied S290756 B331177 Second Appellate District, Div. 1 LORENZO (FRANCISCO) v. CALEX ENGINEERING, INC. Petition for review denied S290759 D083555 Fourth Appellate District, Div. 1 CLEVELAND NATIONAL FOREST FOUNDATION v. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO Petition for review & depublication request(s) denied S290766 B339403 Second Appellate District, Div. 6 COUNTY OF VENTURA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES v. BROWN (JARED-COREY) Petition for review denied S290817 F085830 Fifth Appellate District EMMERICK (MARC) v. COUNTY OF KERN Petition for review denied S290826 ANDERSON (ASHLIE R.) v. NASCH PROPERTIES, LLC Petition for review & application for stay denied S290833 E083714 Fourth Appellate District, Div. 2 PEOPLE v. LU (MING LIANG) Petition for review denied --- PDF page 18 --- SAN FRANCISCO JULY 16, 2025 1027 S290842 AL-SABAH (KHALED J.) v. BASS (MICHAEL EDWARD) Petition for review denied S290872 E085935 Fourth Appellate District, Div. 2 PEOPLE v. CARDOSA (ANDREA MICHELLE) Petition for review denied S290879 A166755 First Appellate District, Div. 4 PEOPLE v. LYNCH (DARRIN RONEL) Petition for review denied S290886 B331338 Second Appellate District, Div. 6 PEOPLE v. SCOTT, JR., (CLIFFORD ALBERT) Petition for review denied S290938 A168582 First Appellate District, Div. 1 IN RE L.H. Petition for review denied S290974 H051583 Sixth Appellate District PEOPLE v. DOMINGUEZ (ULISES CHABLE) Petition for review denied S291004 B322315 Second Appellate District, Div. 7 PEOPLE v. TINAJERO (ANGEL OSVALDO) Petition for review denied S291009 C098342 Third Appellate District PEOPLE v. PAGE (BRELEN) Petition for review denied S291014 B322799 Second Appellate District, Div. 7 BRADSBERY (LA KIMBA) v. VICAR OPERATING, INC. Petition for review & depublication request(s) denied --- PDF page 19 --- SAN FRANCISCO JULY 16, 2025 1028 S291029 C103601 Third Appellate District MARX (CHARLES H.) v. S.C. (PONCIANO) Petition for review & application for stay denied S291038 G065509 Fourth Appellate District, Div. 3 ELIZARRARAS (JOSE) v. S.C. (PEOPLE) Petition for review denied S291044 A170706 First Appellate District, Div. 2 PEOPLE v. McCLOUD (RICKY) Petition for review denied S291063 G064870 Fourth Appellate District, Div. 3 BURGOS (GLENDA) v. DEGIACOMO (EDWARD) Petition for review denied S291081 C102220 Third Appellate District PEOPLE v. FLORES (ARMANDO) Petition for review denied S291092 H051860 Sixth Appellate District PEOPLE v. CALVARY CHAPEL SAN JOSE The request for judicial notice is granted. The petition for review is denied. S291094 B336778 Second Appellate District, Div. 7 CARACHURE (CARLOS) v. CITY OF AZUSA Petition for review denied S291098 C099873 Third Appellate District PEOPLE v. CARDOZA, JR., (JOHN MANUEL) Petition for review denied S291144 B333422 Second Appellate District, Div. 6 PEOPLE v. SANDERS (DANIEL KINGDOM) Petition for review denied --- PDF page 20 --- SAN FRANCISCO JULY 16, 2025 1029 S291146 C100925 Third Appellate District PEOPLE v. ROY (DAVID) Petition for review denied S291147 A170782 First Appellate District, Div. 4 PEOPLE v. HAMMOND (DELVON LAJUAN) Petition for review denied S291152 H051993 Sixth Appellate District PEOPLE v. MONTGOMERY (RYAN VINCENT) Petition for review denied S291153 B335014 Second Appellate District, Div. 4 PEOPLE v. ROBINSON (KEITH) Petition for review denied S291157 H050146 Sixth Appellate District PEOPLE v. EATON (MICHAEL SHANE) Petition for review denied S291163 C097281 Third Appellate District PEOPLE v. FLENER (GARRISON DREW) Petition for review denied S291174 H051666 Sixth Appellate District PEOPLE v. ABARCA (JOSIAS ALEXIS ANGEL) Petition for review denied S291177 E085526 Fourth Appellate District, Div. 2 BROWN (WINSTON MAURICE) v. S.C. (LAFAYETTE FEDERAL CREDIT UNION) Petition for review denied S291194 A173290 First Appellate District, Div. 1 MIMS (SATCHIDANANDA) v. S.C. (HOREJSI) Petition for review denied --- PDF page 21 --- SAN FRANCISCO JULY 16, 2025 1030 S291195 D083336 Fourth Appellate District, Div. 1 PEOPLE v. MORRIS (TAMOYIA DUSHAWN) Petition for review denied S291197 A168754 First Appellate District, Div. 4 PEOPLE v. LANGI (REMUS SAM) The petition for review is denied. Groban, J., is of the opinion the petition should be granted. S291228 A168432 First Appellate District, Div. 5 PEOPLE v. GUTIERREZ (ARTURO PEDRO) Petition for review denied S291229 D080828 Fourth Appellate District, Div. 1 PEOPLE v. MARTINEZ (LUIS JAVIER) Petition for review denied S291247 G063346/G063723 Fourth Appellate District, Div. 3 YOUNG (JENNIFER) v. BYARS (BRANDON M.); COLLECT CO. Petition for review denied S291251 G063264 Fourth Appellate District, Div. 3 PEOPLE v. PATTON (LEONARD JAMES) Petition for review denied S291259 B332330 Second Appellate District, Div. 8 PEOPLE v. CARRERA (NESTOR DANIEL) Petition for review denied S291299 C100754 Third Appellate District PEOPLE v. SUMMERVILLE (DOMINIC) Petition for review denied --- PDF page 22 --- SAN FRANCISCO JULY 16, 2025 1031 S291303 C103650 Third Appellate District HAMMEL (NATHAN) ON H.C. Petition for review denied S291311 D083258 Fourth Appellate District, Div. 1 PEOPLE v. BRAVO (GUILLERMO) Petition for review denied S291320 A165245 First Appellate District, Div. 2 CORNELL (ANN) v. CORNELL (PATRICIA M.) Petition for review denied S291326 B336552 Second Appellate District, Div. 8 PEOPLE v. LOPEZ, JR., (DANIEL LOUIS) Petition for review denied S291331 HILL (NATHAN OWEN) v. COURT OF APPEAL, FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT (PEOPLE) The petition for writ of mandate is denied. S291332 B337094 Second Appellate District, Div. 2 PEOPLE v. PRADO (JAMES) Petition for review denied Liu and Evans, JJ., are of the opinion the petition should be granted. S291334 B337366 Second Appellate District, Div. 7 PEOPLE v. AGUIRRE (TRINIA IRENE) Petition for review denied Liu and Evans, JJ., are of the opinion the petition should be granted. S291336 C100140 Third Appellate District PEOPLE v. BUFORD (TERRY) Petition for review denied --- PDF page 23 --- SAN FRANCISCO JULY 16, 2025 1032 S291342 C103658 Third Appellate District PEOPLE v. BUNCH (JOHN ANTHONY) Petition for review denied S291348 E082388 Fourth Appellate District, Div. 2 PEOPLE v. PATRICK (CURTIS HARVEY) Petition for review denied S291369 B332634 Second Appellate District, Div. 2 PEOPLE v. VALDIVIA (FERNANDO VILLANUEVA) Petition for review denied S291380 F085948 Fifth Appellate District PEOPLE v. ARELLANO (CHRISTIAN JESUS) Petition for review denied S291381 SOPER III (JERRY BENJAMIN) v. COURT OF APPEAL, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION EIGHT (THE PEOPLE CONCERN) The petition for writ of mandate is denied. S291387 G065580 Fourth Appellate District, Div. 3 YOGUEZ (EMILIO) v. S.C. (PEOPLE) Petition for review denied S291393 B335260 Second Appellate District, Div. 4 PEOPLE v. AVILA (JONATHAN MANUEL) Petition for review denied S291397 A169229 First Appellate District, Div. 3 PEOPLE v. SIEGEL (MARC ALEXANDER) Petition for review denied --- PDF page 24 --- SAN FRANCISCO JULY 16, 2025 1033 S291429 H051762 Sixth Appellate District PEOPLE v. ELLIOTT (JAMES THERON) Petition for review denied S291430 AMAYA (SANTOS H.) v. S.C. (PEOPLE) Petition for writ of mandate/prohibition denied S291432 B345937 Second Appellate District, Div. 6 UTLEY (JAMES CHARLES) ON H.C. The petition for review is denied without prejudice to any relief to which petitioner might be entitled after this court decides In re Montgomery, S287339. S291433 B346521 Second Appellate District, Div. 7 GIVENS (ROBERT LEE) ON H.C. Petition for review denied S291438 E085276 Fourth Appellate District, Div. 2 BENT (JAMES) v. DOLCE (ADAM) Petition for review denied S291439 C098622 Third Appellate District PEOPLE v. MENDOZA (MARC FAUSTINO) Petition for review denied S291443 G064556 Fourth Appellate District, Div. 3 PEOPLE v. VELADO (NEOMI RENEE) Petition for review denied S286006 KING (CLINTON DOUGLAS) ON H.C. The petition for writ of habeas corpus has been read and considered. Petitioner contends, among other claims, that he is entitled to relief under the Racial Justice Act of 2020 (Pen. Code, § 745) and requests the appointment of counsel. In this respect, petitioner alleges the trial judge, district attorney, and defense counsel exhibited bias or animus toward him because of his race, ethnicity, or national origin. The petition does not satisfy the statutory requirements for the appointment of counsel under the --- PDF page 25 --- SAN FRANCISCO JULY 16, 2025 1034 Racial Justice Act. (Pen. Code, § 1473, subd. (e) [providing for the appointment of counsel for an indigent petitioner who alleges facts that would establish a violation of the Racial Justice Act].) Petitioner “has not established a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief” under the Racial Justice Act. (Pen. Code, § 1473, subd. (e).) The petitioner fails to allege particularized facts that support his claims based on alleged exhibitions of racial bias. (Id., § 745, subd. (a)(1), (2); cf. In re Swain (1949) 34 Cal.2d 300, 304 [a petition for writ of habeas corpus must allege sufficient facts with particularity].) Nor does petitioner describe or attach supporting documentary evidence concerning these claims. (Cf. People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474 [a petition for writ of habeas corpus must include copies of reasonably available documentary evidence].) The petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. S288318 McDONALD (DUSTIN SEAN-ROSS) ON H.C. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied S288924 BENDER (LEE WILLIS) ON H.C. The petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. (See People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474 [a petition for writ of habeas corpus must include copies of reasonably available documentary evidence].) S289463 JAMES III (EDBERT ROBERT) ON H.C. The petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. (See In re Miller (1941) 17 Cal.2d 734, 735 [courts will not entertain habeas corpus claims that are repetitive].) S289520 RICHEY (WILLIAM OLIVER) ON H.C. The petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. (See People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474 [a petition for writ of habeas corpus must include copies of reasonably available documentary evidence].) S289542 PEDROZA (STEVEN JOSEPH) ON H.C. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied --- PDF page 26 --- SAN FRANCISCO JULY 16, 2025 1035 S289572 HASAN (CLARENCE NIMAR) ON H.C. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied S289597 RHOADES (GREGORY LEE) ON H.C. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied S289601 GUTIERREZ (ISMAEL) ON H.C. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied S289773 STEWART (CODY D.) ON H.C. The petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. (See People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474 [a petition for writ of habeas corpus must include copies of reasonably available documentary evidence].) S289937 TOSCANO (MICHAEL ARTHUR) ON H.C. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied S289949 MILLER (STEVEN) ON H.C. The petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. (See In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 780 [courts will not entertain habeas corpus claims that are untimely]; In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 767-769 [courts will not entertain habeas corpus claims that are successive]; People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474 [a petition for writ of habeas corpus must include copies of reasonably available documentary evidence].) S290740 BRYANT (KEVIN DARNELL) ON H.C. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied S291130 GONZALEZ (JOSE ALBERTO) ON H.C. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied --- PDF page 27 --- SAN FRANCISCO JULY 16, 2025 1036 S291133 GOMEZ (JEFFREY KEVIN) ON H.C. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied S291156 WASHINGTON (ROBERT WAYNE) ON H.C. The petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. (See In re Waltreus (1965) 62 Cal.2d 218, 225 [courts will not entertain habeas corpus claims that were rejected on appeal].) S291162 ROUSE (ROBERT) ON H.C. The petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. (See People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474 [a petition for writ of habeas corpus must include copies of reasonably available documentary evidence]; In re Dexter (1979) 25 Cal.3d 921, 925-926 [a habeas corpus petitioner must exhaust available administrative remedies].) S291278 PARKER (DEWAYNE) ON H.C. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied S290161 D082560 Fourth Appellate District, Div. 1 RAZUKI (SALAM) v. MALAN (NINUS) Publication request denied (case closed) S291116 F085635 Fifth Appellate District GALZINSKI (HARALD MARK) ON H.C. Publication request denied (case closed) S290999 F086622 Fifth Appellate District PEOPLE v. HERNS (LEE ANDREW) The time for granting or denying review in the above-entitled matter is hereby extended to August 19, 2025. --- PDF page 28 --- SAN FRANCISCO JULY 16, 2025 1037 S287152 GRAHAM (JUSTIN DANIEL) ON H.C. Extension of time granted On application of petitioner and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the reply to informal response is extended to August 15, 2025. S282314 BRADSHAW ON DISCIPLINE Order filed Pursuant to the court’s decision of July 3, 2025, the court orders that DREXEL ANDREW BRADSHAW (Respondent), State Bar Number 209584, is disbarred from the practice of law in California and that Respondent’s name is stricken from the roll of attorneys. Respondent must comply with California Rules of Court, rule 9.20 and perform the acts specified in (a) and (c) of that rule within 30 and 40 calendar days, respectively, after the filing date of this court's opinion on July 3, 2025. (See Athearn v. State Bar (1982) 32 Cal.3d 38, 45 [addressing the operative date for identifying clients represented in pending matters and others to be notified].) Failure to do so may result in denial of any future application for reinstatement. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 9.20(d).) Costs are awarded to the State Bar in accordance with Business and Professions Code section 6086.10 and are enforceable both as provided in Business and Professions Code section 6140.7 and as a money judgment, and may be collected by the State Bar through any means permitted by law. Any monetary requirements imposed in this matter shall be considered satisfied or waived when authorized by applicable law or orders of any court. S290680 LINDLEY (CLEVELAND) ON CLEMENCY Motion to file document under seal granted The Governor’s “Motion to Seal Clemency Record”is granted. The Clerk of this court is directed to file under seal the unredacted version of the Commutation File of Cleveland Lindley, lodged conditionally under seal in this court on June 26, 2025, and to file the redacted / public version of the Commutation File of Cleveland Lindley, as received by the court on that date. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.46.) The court hereby finds that on the facts of this case overriding interests exist that overcome the right of public access to these records, to wit, interests as set forth in this court’s Administrative Order 2021-05-26; these overriding interests support sealing the records; a substantial probability exists that the overriding interests will be prejudiced if the records are not sealed; the proposed sealing is narrowly tailored; and no less restrictive means exist to achieve the overriding interests. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 2.550(d)-(e), 8.46(d)(6).) The Clerk shall make the redacted / public version of the record available for public inspection upon request. --- PDF page 29 --- SAN FRANCISCO JULY 16, 2025 1038 S290682 FITTS (DAVID) ON CLEMENCY Motion to file document under seal granted The Governor’s “Motion to Seal Clemency Record” is granted. The Clerk of this court is directed to file under seal the unredacted version of the Commutation File of David Fitts, lodged conditionally under seal in this court on June 26, 2025, and to file the redacted / public version of the Commutation File of David Fitts, as received by the court on that date. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.46.) The court hereby finds that on the facts of this case overriding interests exist that overcome the right of public access to these records, to wit, interests as set forth in this court’s Administrative Order 2021-05-26; these overriding interests support sealing the records; a substantial probability exists that the overriding interests will be prejudiced if the records are not sealed; the proposed sealing is narrowly tailored; and no less restrictive means exist to achieve the overriding interests. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 2.550(d)-(e), 8.46(d)(6).) The Clerk shall make the redacted / public version of the record available for public inspection upon request. S291264 ACCUSATION OF POPPY Petition denied (accusation) S291302 ACCUSATION OF OROZCO Petition denied (accusation) S290918 WOODS ON RESIGNATION Resignation accepted with disciplinary proceeding pending The voluntary resignation with charges pending of GABRIELLE COLLETTE WOODS (Attorney), State Bar Number 133481, as an attorney of the State Bar of California is accepted. If Attorney subsequently seeks reinstatement, the State Bar may consider all disciplinary charges that are currently pending against Attorney. Attorney must comply with California Rules of Court, rule 9.20 and perform the acts specified in (a) and (c) of that rule within 30 and 40 calendar days, respectively, after the date this order is filed. (Athearn v. State Bar (1982) 32 Cal.3d 38, 45 [the operative date for identification of clients being represented in pending matters and others to be notified is the filing date of this order].) Failure to do so may result in denial of any future application for reinstatement. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 9.20(d).) --- PDF page 30 --- SAN FRANCISCO JULY 16, 2025 1039 S291836 AGREE ON RESIGNATION Voluntary resignation accepted The court orders that the voluntary resignation of AVA BIREN AGREE, State Bar Number 339092, as an attorney of the State Bar of California is accepted. S291837 BERNARD ON RESIGNATION Voluntary resignation accepted The court orders that the voluntary resignation of RICHARD S. BERNARD, State Bar Number 281058, as an attorney of the State Bar of California is accepted. S291838 BERRY ON RESIGNATION Voluntary resignation accepted The court orders that the voluntary resignation of ROBERTO EDWIN BERRY, State Bar Number 141272, as an attorney of the State Bar of California is accepted. S291839 COHEN ON RESIGNATION Voluntary resignation accepted The court orders that the voluntary resignation of ELIZABETH ADELE COHEN, State Bar Number 159610, as an attorney of the State Bar of California is accepted. S291840 DAYTON ON RESIGNATION Voluntary resignation accepted The court orders that the voluntary resignation of TRACY LEE DAYTON, State Bar Number 178304, as an attorney of the State Bar of California is accepted. S291841 DeFRANCIS ON RESIGNATION Voluntary resignation accepted The court orders that the voluntary resignation of KARIN MARIE DeFRANCIS, State Bar Number 121704, as an attorney of the State Bar of California is accepted. --- PDF page 31 --- SAN FRANCISCO JULY 16, 2025 1040 S291842 DREFFEIN ON RESIGNATION Voluntary resignation accepted The court orders that the voluntary resignation of M. SHAWN DREFFEIN, State Bar Number 153079, as an attorney of the State Bar of California is accepted. S291843 FLINN ON RESIGNATION Voluntary resignation accepted The court orders that the voluntary resignation of MARGARET ROSE FLINN, State Bar Number 342301, as an attorney of the State Bar of California is accepted. S291844 JONES ON RESIGNATION Voluntary resignation accepted The court orders that the voluntary resignation of MARTIN CHRISTOPHER JONES, State Bar Number 309499, as an attorney of the State Bar of California is accepted. S291845 KASZUBA ON RESIGNATION Voluntary resignation accepted The court orders that the voluntary resignation of VIOLA TRAN KASZUBA, State Bar Number 239712, as an attorney of the State Bar of California is accepted. S291847 MAYER ON RESIGNATION Voluntary resignation accepted The court orders that the voluntary resignation of ALAN LAWRENCE MAYER, State Bar Number 131024, as an attorney of the State Bar of California is accepted. S291849 PEZZINI ON RESIGNATION Voluntary resignation accepted The court orders that the voluntary resignation of DANIELLE MODESTE PEZZINI, State Bar Number 138415, as an attorney of the State Bar of California is accepted. --- PDF page 32 --- SAN FRANCISCO JULY 16, 2025 1041 S291850 SCOTT ON RESIGNATION Voluntary resignation accepted The court orders that the voluntary resignation of MICHAEL PATRICK SCOTT, State Bar Number 139188, as an attorney of the State Bar of California is accepted. S291851 SHIMAMOTO ON RESIGNATION Voluntary resignation accepted The court orders that the voluntary resignation of SEAN M. SHIMAMOTO, State Bar Number 288220, as an attorney of the State Bar of California is accepted. S291853 SHOHET ON RESIGNATION Voluntary resignation accepted The court orders that the voluntary resignation of GRACE COHEN SHOHET, State Bar Number 133870, as an attorney of the State Bar of California is accepted. S291854 SHWACHMAN ON RESIGNATION Voluntary resignation accepted The court orders that the voluntary resignation of BEN SHWACHMAN, State Bar Number 68383, as an attorney of the State Bar of California is accepted. S291855 STALDER ON RESIGNATION Voluntary resignation accepted The court orders that the voluntary resignation of DIANE DESFOR STALDER, State Bar Number 155305, as an attorney of the State Bar of California is accepted. S291856 TORCHIA ON RESIGNATION Voluntary resignation accepted The court orders that the voluntary resignation of MICHAEL JOHN TORCHIA, State Bar Number 101454, as an attorney of the State Bar of California is accepted. --- PDF page 33 --- SAN FRANCISCO JULY 16, 2025 1042 S291857 VanDYKE ON RESIGNATION Voluntary resignation accepted The court orders that the voluntary resignation of ROBERT BRENT VanDYKE, State Bar Number 89650, as an attorney of the State Bar of California is accepted. S291898 BLALOCK III ON RESIGNATION Voluntary resignation accepted The court orders that the voluntary resignation of JAMES AUGUSTUS BLALOCK III, State Bar Number 130582, as an attorney of the State Bar of California is accepted. S291899 CHU ON RESIGNATION Voluntary resignation accepted The court orders that the voluntary resignation of GRACIE WAICHING WONG CHU, State Bar Number 84317, as an attorney of the State Bar of California is accepted. S291921 CICORIA ON RESIGNATION Voluntary resignation accepted The court orders that the voluntary resignation of EVA ANGELICA CICORIA, State Bar Number 132138, as an attorney of the State Bar of California is accepted. S291922 CONLEY ON RESIGNATION Voluntary resignation accepted The court orders that the voluntary resignation of MICHAEL ANDREW CONLEY, State Bar Number 164020, as an attorney of the State Bar of California is accepted. S291931 CUNHA ON RESIGNATION Voluntary resignation accepted The court orders that the voluntary resignation of SHELLI RAE DA CUNHA, State Bar Number 187194, as an attorney of the State Bar of California is accepted. --- PDF page 34 --- SAN FRANCISCO JULY 16, 2025 1043 S291932 DULL ON RESIGNATION Voluntary resignation accepted The court orders that the voluntary resignation of MELISSA ANN DULL, State Bar Number 179464, as an attorney of the State Bar of California is accepted. S291933 GRAHAM-BEARD ON RESIGNATION Voluntary resignation accepted The court orders that the voluntary resignation of WHITTNEY GRAHAM-BEARD, State Bar Number 209890, as an attorney of the State Bar of California is accepted. S291934 GREWAL-KOK ON RESIGNATION Voluntary resignation accepted The court orders that the voluntary resignation of YASMIN GREWAL-KOK, State Bar Number 232239, as an attorney of the State Bar of California is accepted. S291935 LaVIER ON RESIGNATION Voluntary resignation accepted The court orders that the voluntary resignation of ELIZABETH ANNE RICHARDSON LaVIER, State Bar Number 263867, as an attorney of the State Bar of California is accepted. S291936 MESSPLAY ON RESIGNATION Voluntary resignation accepted The court orders that the voluntary resignation of ARIANNA CHERNOVE MESSPLAY, State Bar Number 260535, as an attorney of the State Bar of California is accepted. S291938 MINUI-THOMAS ON RESIGNATION Voluntary resignation accepted The court orders that the voluntary resignation of DARIA R. MINUI-THOMAS, State Bar Number 152097, as an attorney of the State Bar of California is accepted. --- PDF page 35 --- SAN FRANCISCO JULY 16, 2025 1044 S291939 PARIS ON RESIGNATION Voluntary resignation accepted The court orders that the voluntary resignation of MICHELLE RAE PARIS, State Bar Number 166549, as an attorney of the State Bar of California is accepted. S291940 RIOS ON RESIGNATION Voluntary resignation accepted The court orders that the voluntary resignation of JENNY RIOS, State Bar Number 167206, as an attorney of the State Bar of California is accepted. S291943 RITTER ON RESIGNATION Voluntary resignation accepted The court orders that the voluntary resignation of THOMAS D. RITTER, State Bar Number 229862, as an attorney of the State Bar of California is accepted. S291944 SEWELL ON RESIGNATION Voluntary resignation accepted The court orders that the voluntary resignation of TRAVIS TAYLOR SEWELL, State Bar Number 176069, as an attorney of the State Bar of California is accepted. S291945 TROUTMAN ON RESIGNATION Voluntary resignation accepted The court orders that the voluntary resignation of MARZETTA JONES TROUTMAN, State Bar Number 198297, as an attorney of the State Bar of California is accepted. S291946 UHL ON RESIGNATION Voluntary resignation accepted The court orders that the voluntary resignation of ERIC JOHN UHL, State Bar Number 131519, as an attorney of the State Bar of California is accepted. --- PDF page 36 --- SAN FRANCISCO JULY 16, 2025 1045 S291948 WELINDER ON RESIGNATION Voluntary resignation accepted The court orders that the voluntary resignation of YANA WELINDER, State Bar Number 260732, as an attorney of the State Bar of California is accepted. S291949 WINTERBERGER ON RESIGNATION Voluntary resignation accepted The court orders that the voluntary resignation of MARLA JEAN WINTERBERGER, State Bar Number 131144, as an attorney of the State Bar of California is accepted. S291950 WONG ON RESIGNATION Voluntary resignation accepted The court orders that the voluntary resignation of TODD WONG, State Bar Number 154894, as an attorney of the State Bar of California is accepted. S290996 DIAS (AYLANA MARIA BRAGA) v. COMMITTEE OF BAR EXAMINERS OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA Motion denied The motion for special admission is denied as moot.